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INTRODUCTION
Over the life time of the Space Shuttle program, metal parts used for the Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs)
have been nondestructively inspected for cracks and surface breaking discontinuities using magnetic particle (steel)
and penetrant methods. Although these inspections adequately screened for critical sized cracks in most regions of
the hardware, it became apparent after detection of several sub-critical flaws that the processes were very dependent
on operator attentiveness and training. Throughout the 1990's, eddy current inspections were added to areas that
had either limited visual access or were more fracture critical. In the late 1990's. a project was initiated to upgrade
NDE inspections with the overall objective of improving inspection reliability and control. An automated eddy
current inspection system was installed in 2001. Figure 1 shows one of the inspection bays with the robotic axis of
the system highlighted. The system was programmed to inspect the various case, nozzle, and igniter metal
components that make up an RSRM. both steel and aluminum. For the past few years, the automated inspection
system has been a part of the baseline inspection process for steel components. Although the majority of the RSRM
metal part inventory ts free of detectable surface flaws, a few small, sub-critical manufacturing defects have been
detected with the automated system. This paper will summarize the benefits that have been realized with the current
automated eddy current system, as well as the flaws that have been detected.
BENEFITS OF THE AUTOMATED EDDY CURRENT SYSTEM
Reliability
The primary reason for implementing the automated system (named AIIS for Automated Inductive Inspection
System) was to increase the overall reliability of the inspection process. Simply put, reliability can be defined as the
assurance that critical sized flaws wilt be detected. There are several factors that contribute to (and some
synonymous with) inspection reliability.
Control & Repeatability
The AIIS is a sensor-based, robotic system and therefore has a great deal of control and repeatability, which is
highly valued when working in the space program. All components and probes, some of which are shown in figure
2. are documented and controlled on tooling drawings. All RSRM parts are initially programmed and inspection
coverage of required surfaces is verified. These programs and all associated software are controlled through a
software configuration control procedure, assuring that all required surfaces are inspected the same way each time.
The sensors are calibrated, assuring a measurable and consistent level of sensitivity and response. All calibration
and detection "thresholds" are traced back to extensive Probability of-Detection (POD) _testing performed on actual
cracks. This helps ensure that the required flaw sizes will be detected with a high level of statistical probability and
confidence.
Although inspector variability is never fully eliminated, it is greatly reduced with the AIIS. The inspectors primary
responsibility is to insure that "good" data is collected (no unexpected lift-off, digital acquisition problems, etc),
reviewed for cracks, and archi_ed. Review of data for cracks is both by visual review of C-scans, with color coding
corresponding to decision thresholds, and by review of results from computer algorithms that scan the data for
crack-like signals. All of these factors help insure that multiple scans of a given part will produce repeatable data,
with very high confidence that the flaw as large as or larger than the requirement will be found.
Sensitivity
In a statistical sense, the sensitivity of an inspection could be defined as its Minimum Detectable Flaw Size (MDFS).
or the flaw size that is detected with a 90% probability (and 95% confidence level). The smaller the MDFS. the
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more reliable the system becomes at screening critical sized flaws. The POD for the eddy CUITent system produces a
smaller MDFS than the POD of the magnetic particle inspection process (1. 2) and is therefore more statistically
reliable at detecting the required flaws. As will be seen, tlaws that have been detected on flight hardware have been
significantly smaller than the MDFS for a given area, which illustrates the conservatism built into the calibration
process.
Data Archiving
The AIlS allows for the storage and archiving of all inspection data. Because the metal hardware is reusable, this
can allow for trending of unusual material conditions. Also, if cracks are detected, historical data can help
determine the nature of the flaw (manufacturing tlaw vs. service induced). Data is stored on an intranet server and
can be easily accessed.
Reduction of Solvent Wastes
With the historical magnetic particle and penetrant processes, the inspection of large scale components produced lots
of chemical & solvent waste. This includes an acid etch bath that has to be maintained for inspection of aluminum
nozzle components. Disposal and maintenance of these materials requires extensive attention to insure compliance
with safety procedures and environmental codes.
Figure 1: AIlS Bay for Nozzle, Igniter & Dome Hardware
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Figure 2: Various elements associated with AIlS: a) Dovetail joint to mount inspection sleds, b) mounted hole
scanner, c) sled for "skiing" over holes, and d) sled for large acreages.
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AIIS has been inspecting hardware now for several years, along side the baseline magnetic particle and penetrant
processes. Currently, approximately 40% of the RSRM steel hardware inventory has been inspected with AIIS.
During initial implementation, it was expected that the metal hardware as a whole was quite healthy. The reason is
that all metal components are refurbished after each Space Shuttle flight. Refurbishment primarily consists of
inspecting the hardware to insure it complies with engineering requirements. This includes a complete
Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) inspection to screen the hardware for surface discontinmties. The vast majority
of components have gone through several refurbishment inspections. Therefore. if any manufacturing flaws existed
in a component after its fabrication, they would most likely have been detected previously with magnetic particle or
penetrant (or with localized eddy current that is performed on select hardware features). Service-induced stress
corrosion cracks primarily occur on select features of the booster aft segmem and are due to splashdown loads.
The expectation, then, was that if flaws were to be found, they would be smaller than the reliably detectable flaw
size for the magnetic particle or penetrant inspections. This has turned out to be the case. At this point in time.
seven of the components out of over 320 inspected were found to have small surface or near-surface discontinuities
(cracks or very thin inclusions near or at the surface). Three were aluminum (same component type), and four were
steel (three component types). Table 1 summarizes the findings. Of the seven components, 2 were new parts (first
time inspection), while the rest were on multiple refurbishments (i.e., had been inspected before, sometimes up to as
many as 6 or 7 times). All detected flaws were manufacturing defects. Interestingly. the very first part inspected (a
brand new aluminum Nose Inlet Housing, which is part of the nozzle assembly) was found to have several surface
discontinuities (long shallow cracks that looked to have some foreign material or impurity associated with them).
Until recentl y, none of the case hardware components (part of the primary pressure vessel) were found to have
flaws. Earlier this year, however, a cylinder was inspected and found to have 12 small cracks in the ID
membrane/acreage regions. These flaws are summarized in Figure 3. Figures 4 through 6 show representative eddy
current C-scan images of cracks found in various parts. The C-scan images incorporate a gray scale color palette
with color coded "decision thresholds" correlating to acceptance criteria. A blue indication corresponds to a
circumferentially oriented flaw. while a magenta indication corresponds to a longitudinally oriented flaw.
Component
Nozzle/Nose
Inlet Housing (3
parts)
Nozzle/Forward
Exit Cone
Table 1:
Cracks detected
Summary of cracks detected on RSRM metal hardware.
Multiple - over 20
among all 3 parts.
All cracks were on
the OD membrane
surface, running
circumferentially
Approx. sizes
Typically long and
shallow
Depth: shallow, less
than 0.030" many
around 0.010"-0.020"
Length: between
0.10" to -0.75"
Very small, <0.10"
long and <0.005"
deep.
Largest
approximately 0.150"
long by 0.050" deep
Igniter chamber
(2 parts)
Two on a flange
surface. New part,
first time inspected
Cylinder
Multiple on same
surface of each
part; mostly
circumferential
All very small (well
below detection
requirement for that
area - see table 2).
12 ID membrane;
circumferential &
longitudinal
orientations.
Unique features
Most all of the flaws
were in conjunction
with pitting (even one
part that was brand
new). Discontinuities
continued down below
the pitting
Machined smooth
surface, found in region
calibrated for higher
sensitivity
All flaws found on a
smooth machined
surface. Unable to
visually detect.
All manufacturing
flaws. Part was on 6 th
refurbishment. Unable
to visually detect.
Action taken
Flaws blended out
Flaws blended out.
Largest was blended
out on one component
(component was
scrapped. Other
component is used as
test article
All cracks were
verified with local MT
and blended out.
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Figure 3: Summary of crack dimensions found on cylinder.
Bottom image in b) is derivative oftop image in b).
Figure 4: a) Igniter chamber boss with W' threaded holes, b) C-scan images of eddy current data from the
same surface on a different chamber.
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Figure 5: Inspection of an Aluminum Nose Inlet Housing - a) C-scan of circumferential flaw, b)
corresponding impedance plane & strip chart data, c) photo of the flawed area (defect extended ~
15 mils below the surface pitting.
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Figure 6: Cracks on cylinder ID: a) eddy current C-scan, b) impedance plane data of cracks, c) mag particle
image of largest crack.
Approved for public release by NASA
SUMMARY
An automated eddy current inspection system has been implemented for inspection of Space Shuttle RSRM metal
hardware. The NDE aspects of the system were thoroughly characterized through POD testing prior to and after
installation. Current findings on RSRM hardware are consistent with expectations, and provide evidence that the
system is very reliable and capable of detecting the required flaw sizes.
REFERENCES
1. Hartman and Hibbert. "Probability of Detection Results of Eddy Current Inspection for Ferromagnetic Space
Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters". Paper Summaries of the 1995 ASNT Spring Conference and Fourth Annual
Research Symposium, Las Vegas, NV, 1995.
2. Hartman and Kirby, "Automation of NDE on Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Metal Components", Abstracts
th
of the ASNT Spring Conference and i 1 Annual Research Symposium, Portland, OR, 2002.
Approved for public release by NASA
VY\SfC- 5Lo l
~T~
~
"'-. 0' ..~ • ~," " ~ .'. , • " .. An advanced weapon and space systems company
Automated Eddy Current Inspection on
Space Shuttle Hardware
John Hartman
Principal NOT Engineer
(435) 863-4516
john.hartman@atk.com
Nov. 16,2007
Outline <!!T~
~~ ,;-,,,,-,<. , ~. ,,'. .' _ An advanced weapon and space systems company
Outline
• Historical inspections on RSRM metal hardware
• Reasons for changing to an Automated Inductive Inspection (eddy current) System
(AilS)
• Brief overview of the system
• Inspection results on hardware since implementation
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Historically, most NDE was visual based
• Magnetic Particle on steel parts
Case Components (Aft Dome)
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Historically, most NDE was visual based
• Magnetic Particle on steel parts
Nozzle Components - Throat Housing
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Historically, most NDE was visual based
• Magnetic Particle on steel parts
Igniter Components
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Historically, most NDE was visual based
• Penetrant on aluminum nozzle parts
Nose Inlet Housing
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Semi-automated and manual eddy current on critical or limited access areas'
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Reasons for changing to AilS
• Foremost is increased reliability, which could be defined as the assurance that critical
sized flaws will be detected
- Automation means that large metal parts are scanned the same way each time
- Less dependency on inspector attentiveness
- More control
• Overall sensitivity is increased (more sub-critical smaller flaws will be found)
• Archiving of data
- "Proof' of Inspection - auditable
- Possible trending", helps to confirm the origin of a crack (manufacturing vs, service
induced)
• Elimination or reduction of solvent wastes", less environmental & safety concerns
- Acid etch
• In 2000, funding was appropriated to build and install an AilS
Overview of AilS (!~T-'5~
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Overview of the system
• Two inspection bays
H-7 bay for large case cylindrical parts
10
H-6 bay for smaller nozzle & igniter parts
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Overview of the system
• AilS integrates a 5 axis robotic system with an eddy current data acquisition system
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Overview of the system
• Close up of inspection wrist
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Overview of the system
• For inspection of holes, a rotary scanner with linear drive is attached to the wrist (two
additional axes of motion)
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Overview of the system
• The inspection turntable is on rails, and extends into the high bay for loading and
offloading of components
• Components are mounted on adjustable chocks
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Overview of the system
Probes or inspection "sleds" used for different surfaces and geometries are mounted to
the inspection "wrist" via a dovetail joint
Pneumatic pressure and spring tension
help insure compliance to part
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Overview of the system
The primary inspector interface is a
check-list based program
Data is gathered on the part with each
inspection sled, including calibration
scans
Data is reviewed by operator for cracks
- Software tools help to flag crack-like
responses
After review, data is archived on an
intranet storage system
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Inspection Results on hardware
• AilS has been inspecting metal hardware (mostly steel) for several years
Inspections have been concurrent with historic mag particle & penetrant inspections
• Nearly 400 components have been inspected
• Most components inspected were refurbished, meaning they had been used and
inspected more than once already
Expectation?
• Overall, the majority of the hardware should be fairly healthy, having received multiple
inspections over its lifetime
• If surface cracks were to be found, they would likely be smaller or shallower than the
reliably detectable crack sizes for mag particle and penetrant determined from POD
testing
17
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Inspection Results on hardware
• This turned out to be the case
• Most hardware was healthy
Up to this point, only 8 components have been found with cracks or discontinuities
- Four aluminum nozzle components
- Four steel components
• All flaws detected, except for one aluminum component, were very small, sub-critical
manufacturing flaws
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Inspection Results on hardware
Aluminum Nose Inlet Housing (Nozzle Component)
• Three separate parts were found with shallow crack-like inclusions
• The very first part (a new part) inspected with the system was found to have several
cracks
- The part surface was machined and very smooth, but all the cracks were in
conjunction with pitting (-0.005" deep)
- Flaws were blended out - deepest was around 0,020"
• Two other refurbished Nose Inlet Housings have also been found with similar defects in
the same region of the part,
- The flaws were typically "long" (still less than 1") and shallow (deepest around 0.030")
- They correlate with pitting
- Some of the flaws were visually verified during removal (blending)
• All flaws were manufacturing flaws
19
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Inspection Results on hardware
Aluminum Components - Nose Inlet Housing
17.
16.
15.
14.
13.
12.
11.
10.
'.
8.
1.
'Bottom C-scan is filtered image of top C-scan
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Inspection Results on hardware
Aluminum Components - Two other Nose Inlet Housings had similar
circumferential defects in the same region (00 membrane). Also, an Aft Exit Cone
was verified to have a corner crack (part was initially inspected with penetrant)
16.0
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0-Ar. ....... ....;..;. ;...._;,;....; ~_=~
Aft Exit Cone Corner Crack
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Inspection Results on hardware
D6AC Steel Igniter Chamber
• Two separate parts found with flaws in the same region
- One chamber dedicated for flight, the other for testing
.----===-------::==---"--iVert (ECUI
100
80,
60
40
20
o
-20
-40
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-80
-100
Flight Chamber - Circumferential crack
- 0.052" deep
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Inspection Results on hardware
D6AC Steel Igniter Chamber
• Test article
~ ..,..... •• J" __ .... _ ....
EDM notches Pitting and cracks/inclusions
Bottom images are the same as the top but they are filtered (differentially)
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Inspection Results on hardware
D6AC Steel Forward Exit Cone (Nozzle Component)
• New component
Detected several very shallow defects on a machined flange surface using a higher
resolution probe
- Confirmed visually & with mag particle
- Blended out flaws - deepest was only 0.005"
24
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Inspection Results on hardware
D6AC Steel Cylinder (Case Component)
• On it's 6th refurbishment (i.e., had been inspected multiple times over the years)
• Detected 12 small cracks on the ID membrane of the cylinder
• All cracks were manufacturing flaws with different orientations
• Lengths were on average around 0.100" or smaller (required detection level was 0.250"
by 0.125" deep). Depths are summarized below
Blend Depths of cracks
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Inspection Results on hardware
D6AC Steel Cylinder (Case Component)
• All cracks were eventually confirmed with local mag particle and pencil probe eddy
current inspections
• Examples of C-scan images from AilS and wet fluorescent mag images are shown on
the following charts
26
Results on hardware - Case Cylinder (!~TI£>
~~,~~~~->··~-_.~,""",,o .', '_ _.' _~'-' ,An advanced weapon and space systems company _, j
C-scan of differential
(filtered) vertical
amplitude response
C-scan of vertical
amplitude response
Impedance plane &
strip chart data
Notice eVidence of a
factory blend, a ·swath"
gomg diagonal across
the image
.1J .J
Cursor WIdth Vii RaTio
A{JPIy to C Sr.ftn
_,_:LL _1_[[ M••••.• ECU.M.,2Ud••
102.0
.J)
Amplitude
A
-+-
I /
a
-
100
-'.., j
notation
M.O 203.7 ECU. An.g 306 6 de-V
27
Results on hardware - Case Cylinder (!!T~
~~,"-~~"~~'~~'J''-''c.._ _.'"'_~, _" ,"',_~ An advanced weapon and space systems company,,-...!
Crack #1: Mag image of crack using portable yoke with wet fluorescent spray
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Crack #2: Mag image of crack using portable yoke with wet fluorescent spray
Note: Edge of blend "swath"
Roll band lines are -0.040" apart
Roll Bands
-0.040· apart
I
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Crack #3: AilS eddy current data
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Crack #3: Wet fluorescent mag image
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Crack #s 4-7: AilS eddy current data & mag image
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Summary
• An automated eddy current system has been implemented to inspect RSRM metal
components
• The system was thoroughly characterized through POD testing both before and
after installation
• The system has demonstrated improved reliability at detecting cracks compared
to the historical visual based inspections.
